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Twice in the course of the last decade the contours of Americanism have
changed dramatically. On the first occasion, arriving in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, Americanism changed from pluralism and tolerance to conformism and
coercion. On the second, after the election of Barack Obama, it reverted to its
earlier form, but with some alterations. Accordingly, the notion of social justice
has also been greatly altered. From a strictly binary opposition between good and
evil it has become more nuanced and pluralistic. All three papers under review
directly or indirectly refer to these changes, which may also be described as the
tension between pluralism and unity in American society.
Professor Sollors’s paper addresses the problems and possibilities of a
multilingual United States. Professor Muller’s contribution seeks to “complicate
the prevailing narrative about the government’s approach to Americanism”
through a revision of the Japanese-American experience in WWII. Professor
Gottschalk’s study reveals that the prison system, which ostensibly serves as a
means for promoting social stability and social justice, in fact heightens social
tension, and promotes or even solidifies racial and ethnic discrimination.
It seems to me that the three authors share the ideals of pluralism and
tolerance regarding the ethnic constitution of American society. These ideals
include a respect for cultural differences and ethnic heritages, the defense of the
right to dissent, and the freedom to lead a decent life. In the past eight years, such
ideals have been almost silenced by the post-9/11 jingoistic nationalism. The
same ideals, however, harmonize well with the results of the 2008 election and
the birth of the first African-American President, a man who stresses dialogue and
mutual understanding between various social groups.
Against this backdrop Professor Sollors develops his idea of a multilingual
society. He persuasively argues that in order to understand the current diversity
of American society in terms of language it is necessary to awaken many
memories of its multilingual past. The main assumptions of Sollors’s paper
remind me of the American Socialist Party during the Progressive period, which
was organized along ethnic lines and whose unity was based on a common
socialist ideology. The organizational structure of the American Socialist Party
was thus radically distinct from that of its counterparts in Europe. The party
consisted of countless chapters, each of which maintained its own linguistic
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identity. Each chapter published its printed materials in its own language. But
the content of such publications, which argued for socialism as the sole means for
achieving a just and equal society, was fundamentally identical. Through such
means the party respected ethnic diversity based on language while achieving
ideological harmony. The success of this type of compromise relied on the socio-
economic reality of American society during this era. In major urban areas
laborers belonging to various ethnic groups lived in their own mutually
segregated enclaves and could hope to achieve some degree of class solidarity
only on the basis of a shared political ideology.
The American Socialist Party, however, declined very quickly after the US
entry into WWI. Wartime nationalists suppressed multilingualism as well as
oppositional socialism. The immigration restriction measures introduced in the
twenties virtually stopped the influx of immigrants from various countries and
effectively dried the pool of multilingualism.
After WWII and particularly after the immigration law of 1965 the trend
reversed again and the number of immigrants has dramatically increased. Today,
however, the situation is somewhat different from that of the Progressive era. It
seems to me that it is not particularly propitious for multilingualism. To be sure,
immigrants, now usually from Latin America and Asia rather than Europe, still
come to the United States for economic reasons, but the pressure of the
international market place forces them to speak English. Mainstream Americans
are suspect of the so-called illegals and the communities of new immigrants are
constantly threatened by the raids of the US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, as Gottschalk’s paper indicates. Not only is English necessary for
surviving in this situation in the United States but also for competing in the global
market. Increased mobility, both nationally and internationally, also fosters the
use of English throughout the nation and even abroad. These factors constantly
erode the class basis of multilingualism, which existed during the Progressive
period. On the other hand, political ideology, far from unifying a large number of
discrete linguistic groups has come to emphasize cultural identity and with it,
linguistic abilities.
I would like to ask Prof. Sollors how he conceives of the link of
multilingualism to the socio-economic realities that confront linguistic minority
groups in the United States. And it seems to me that the main target of the recent
“English Only” movement is not multilingualism but bilingualism of English and
Hispanic. If so, could I suppose that multilingualism is today basically an elite
phenomenon?
Professor Muller suggests that it is necessary to distinguish between the
military and civilian (i.e. the WRA staff) views of loyalty of Japanese American
internees during WWII. While the former believed the allegiances of the
internees was highly dubious, the latter exhibited far more faith in the loyalty of
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those interned. These two positions reflect two very different views of the nature
of Americanism. The military’s position resembled that of the Bush
administration’s attitude toward Islamic American citizens, whereas the civilian
staff of the WRA is closer to the standpoint of the Obama administration. Of
course Obama is far more tolerant than the WRA ever was. But if I read Muller
correctly, the position taken by the civilian staff of the WRA can be connected to
the old cosmopolitan progressive Americanism, which, in turn, feeds into
Obama’s vision of the American future.
Professor Muller’s exposition of these two lines of Americanism seems to me
tenable. But I would like to suggest the situation might be complicated even
further. What seems to be missing to me is the perspective of the relationship
between the Japanese government and Japanese Americans before and during the
war. Before coming to the United States, most Japanese Issei (the first generation
of Japanese immigrants) underwent a compulsory elementary education in
Imperial Japan, which was highly centralized and nationalistic. They brought that
ethnocentric national ideology into their social life in the United States. In the
early 20
th
century the US Immigration Commission recognized the effect of their
education in their home country. As a Congressional Report to that era states:
[T]he Japanese are greatly interested in political matters, are intelligent, quick to
absorb new ideas, and progressive, but have been accustomed to a somewhat
different forms of government and have exhibited a strength of feeling for and
loyalty to their country and its Government and the Mikado, seldom, if ever, found
among other people.
1
In spite of this kind of American view of Japanese immigrants, we should not
forget that many homeland Japanese considered pre-war emigrants from the land
of the rising sun to be akin to traitors. Such people were always suspected of
disloyalty towards the emperor and the mother country. As one Japanese
diplomat had already averred in the late 19
th
century, “The Japanese law does not
suppose that the subjects can cut their ties with the Emperor at will and be
naturalized in foreign countries.”
2
Following this traditional interpretation, the
Japanese government counseled all emigrants to remain faithful to the imperial
cause. To such advice, some Japanese Americans responded enthusiastically.
Before the outbreak of the war a small number of them even returned to the land
of their birth to fight for national glory. The addition of their perspective to the
argument would, I believe, lead to a more complete view of the situation, one that
takes into account that the ethnic racial and cultural and political ideology
espoused by the Japanese government constituted an important element in the
thinking and behavior of Japanese Americans before and during the war. John
Dower, in his book, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, has
already analyzed the influence of racial ideologies on both sides of the Pacific on
the pursuit of the war. It would be interesting to see what effect such ideologies
on the Japanese side had on the internment issue.
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In her study, Professor Gottschalk depicts the effect on American civic life of
mass incarceration by what she terms “the carceral state.” Her very informative
paper reveals in detail the exceptional features of the American penal system.
The problems of prisons contain serious issues concerning race and ethnicity, and
are therefore closely linked to the debates regarding social justice and
Americanism. The sheer number of people in jail or prison itself is staggering.
One in a hundred Americans is incarcerated at any given time. Three million
people, with an 8- to 1 black-to-white ratio, are robbed of voting rights and made
invisible in the American labor market, thereby greatly distorting political and
economic justice. This presents a new type of discrimination chiefly against
Afro-Americans and Hispanic immigrants, a discrimination of the kind that the
Great Society programs promised to abolish. Both public spending on prison
construction and maintenance and the bureaucracy of the Justice Department have
become swollen despite the Bush administration’s stated aim of shrinking
government. Even the improvement of the public education system has come to
be seen as mostly a matter of controlling crime in schools.
In addition mass imprisonment is becoming a major women’s issue, by
leaving millions of women without any breadwinners, while ironically many men
are incarcerated for domestic violence.
According to Professor Gottschalk the reason for the rise of the “carceral
state” since the 1960s has been political. Experts on crime do not necessarily
agree with the common sense view that in the time of economic distress people
tend to turn crime to survive. Economic crises instead stimulate social uprisings
and heighten the general feeling of social angst. In this situation some
conservative politicians, who fear increased social protests, strikes, and civil
unrest, conflate such social action with crime. This explains why the “carceral
state” began to take shape during the decade of the civil rights movement and the
Vietnam war and have continued growing in the age of Reagan (as defined by
Sean Wilentz).
I learned much from Gottschalk’s paper and agree that without taking “the
carceral state” into account, any depiction of Americanism and social justice
today is incomplete. Nonetheless, I would like to ask the author about her
conclusion that the carceral state is fundamentally “a political problem, not a
crime and punishment problem.” In order to solve the penal problems today, she
argues, the “root causes” approach is useless. The carceral state cannot be
dissolved by “focusing on ameliorating structural problems like widespread
poverty, high unemployment, dysfunctional schools, an ineffective health-care
system, and outcomes dramatically stratified by race.”
I would agree that the problem of the “carceral state” has a kind of autonomy
or logic of its own, similar to that of the “military-industrial complex,” which also
did not simply disappear once the “root cause” of the Cold War had vanished.
Yet it also seems to me that the issue of crime and punishment itself also contains
an important political dimension that, though perhaps not derivable from, is
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nevertheless closely associated with economic factors. Although Gottschalk’s
paper analyzes in detail the economics of the prison system and the politics of
punishment, it does not clearly acknowledge the fact that the basis of crime is also
both economic and political. I would thus like to know how Professor Gottschalk
would propose to address the political and economic dimensions of the problem
of crime, a problem that Bush failed so miserably to solve, and which his
administration in fact exacerbated. The answer to this question is for me of
personal importance, for I have often argued, and frequently teach my students,
that a fundamental solution to the problem of crime in the United States depends
on the solution of precisely such “root causes.” After reading this paper I am a
little bewildered about what I should now teach.
For Obama, too, an acknowledgement of the politics of crime and punishment
seems uncircumventable if he wishes to gain sufficient public support for
beginning to dismantle the “carceral state.” Although it is impossible to
overestimate the significance of Obama’s election as a milestone for a better
integrated multicultural society, Obama has not yet begun to overcome the socio-
economic barrier defined by race. His victory in that sense does not mean the end
of racial segregation and the establishment of socio-racial justice in the United
States. Immediately after the November elections, one political commentator
wrote that during the campaign Obama called for freeing ourselves from the
paralyzing racial stalemate, but that the most urgent and acute racial issue of
“crime and public safety” had been totally ignored in the campaign. Even half a
year later since his inauguration, President Obama has not touched upon the
politics of crime and punishment and it remains unclear whether or how he can
begin to gather the political momentum necessary that would allow him to begin
to dismantle the problem of the “carceral state.”
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